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Scoping and Bias in the Fireground: 
 A new approach to understanding fireground “situation awareness” 
Scoping the fireground. A new approach to understanding how information is taken  in 
and used on the fireground  is being developed by staff from the Gloucestershire Fire and 
Rescue Service and CRACKLE (Centre for Research in Applied Cognition, Knowledge, 
Learning and Emotion) at the University of Gloucestershire. The research involves 
observing FRS teams during training exercises to determine how individuals and teams  
use information about the fireground situation.  
 
The particular interest is how the firegound is “scoped”- that is, whether people work from 
a broad span of information or focus down on a small part of the available information. 
This “scoping” can have an external or internal aspect. In an external sense, it can affect 
the visual inspection of the fireground (people can scan widely or narrowly). In an internal 
sense, it can affect the mental impression that is formed about the situation (people can 
think widely about a situation or narrow down on a few aspects). The two aspects are 
closely linked: for example, a narrow internal scope could lead to incomplete visual 
inspection of the situation and vice versa, narrow external scanning of a situation could 
give an incomplete mental picture or impression of the situation.  
 
Scoping may have important consequences for decisions and errors made in actual 
firegound situations (Catherwood, Edgar, Sallis, Medley, 2010). The ultimate aim of the 
current project is to improve understanding of how scoping might affect operational 
command and control decision-making on the incident ground and to develop guidelines 
for training self-awareness of the “scoping” of information in actual fireground situations. 
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Background ideas and research. Past research by team members (eg., in regard to military 
situations: Edgar & Edgar, 2007; Edgar et al., 2009) has shown that individuals differ in how 
much of the available information that they use and trust in making decisions- referred to as 
the “bias” or “scope” of the individual. Even when individuals basically have the same 
knowledge of a situation, they may still vary in how or how much of that information that 
they actually choose to use in making decisions.  Some people may trust or use only a narrow 
range or scope of available information, while others may be more “lax”, trusting or using a 
wider scope of information. Even the same person may vary in the scope or bias that they use 
in different situations.  
 
As noted above, bias or scope can apply to either the external situation (how the situation is 
scanned) or to internal information (the breadth of the mental impression of the situation used 
to make decisions). Even if a wide range of  information is seen and taken on board and 
lodged in the mental impression or knowledge about a situation, people can still mentally or 
internally adjust their scope so they can select the points they want to use from the full range 
available in their knowledge or memory. It is like having a wide-screen TV display of the 
situation in your mind, but staring at only one part of the screen. This can explain some of the 
puzzling errors people make even when theoretically they have all the correct knowledge 
available to them. The full range of information is there in the person’s knowledge, but not 
necessarily used or noted in actually making decisions. 
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  (a)                                                                           (b)   
Figure 1: People vary in the “bias” or “scope” of information used in decision-making: some 
may have a wide bias (a), others more narrow (b): each approach carries its own risks. 
The Risks.  Neither  a lax  or tight bias or scope is necessarily correct or necessarily wrong. 
The important thing is to check that the appropriate scope is being used at critical points in 
appraising the situation. At some points in making decisions, a broad scope may be best 
while at others a narrower one may be needed.  Nonetheless, each has its own dangers. If 
people apply too narrow a bias or scope, they run the risk of ignoring important aspects of a 
situation (eg., staring at a tiny burning ember near your feet while the roof is about to 
collapse on you from above), while having a broad bias or scope may mean very important 
information is not given any more focus than irrelevant information.  
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People may have their own personal bias tendencies, but for most people, any sudden and 
unexpected change in a situation seems to produce a narrow bias– so that people restrict their 
mental focus to what seems important to them in the situation. In general, this can often be a 
good plan: for example, it seems like a good idea to narrowly focus on a burning roof 
descending on you from above!  But this tendency also carries the risk of overlooking 
important aspects of the situation that were not expected or predictable (eg., that an exit has 
now been suddenly blocked) and this is how errors in decision-making can occur in stressful 
and changeable situations. The ultimate goal of the current research programme is to further 
the understanding of this tendency in order to support the training of effective fireground 
decision-making. 
The Project so far. To begin, FRS personnel in Minerva and Hydra training exercises were 
observed and this formed the basis for developing a further study of 16 operational FRS 
personnel (in 6 teams of 2 or 3 people) during a BA-guideline training exercise (Catherwood, 
Edgar, Sallis, Medley, 2010). Immediately after the BA exercise, individuals were asked to 
respond to true-false questions about both briefed and non-briefed aspects of the exercise. An 
example of the briefed items is: “You were briefed to search off branch line 2: True/False”, 
while an example of a non-briefed items is: “There were two branch lines in the building: 
True/False”.  
The responses were then analysed by a method developed by the research team called QASA: 
(Quantitative assessment of situation awareness). This method takes into account not only the 
percentage of correct answers (the knowledge or “situation awareness” score) but also the 
person’s tendency to say True or False. This gives some idea of  the person’s scope or bias: 
at one extreme, a person saying “true” to everything is showing a very lax or broad scope, 
accepting all the information available to them in an uncritical way, while at the other 
extreme, a person saying “False” to everything is showing a very restricted scope, only 
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accepting a narrow range of information as being true or useful and rejecting or overlooking 
the rest.  
Overall the analysis shows that knowledge or situation awareness was good, although 
predictably it was better for briefed items (average of 88.6% correct) than non-briefed items 
(average 68.8% correct) - and a non-briefed item (“There was a gas cylinder outside the 
building”) showed the lowest score of all (average 25% correct). Interestingly however the 
results also show that two people can seem to have similar knowledge but in fact still have a 
very different scope or bias in regard to that knowledge.  
For example two people scored especially well on the knowledge tests:  Person A obtaining 
88% correct and Person B getting 91% correct, but their scoping or bias scores tell a very 
different story- one was applying a very narrow scope to the knowledge and the other a much 
broader scope. Their results are shown in Figure 1: there are two scores shown for each 
person: a knowledge score in blue (from +100 or 100% correct ranging down to  -100 or 
100% wrong) and a scoping or bias score in red (also from +100 being very strict to -100 
being very lax).  
 
Figure 2. Examples of Results from BA-guideline exercise showing two people with apparently similar good 
Knowledge scores, but very different Scopes/Biases: Person A having a narrower or stricter bias and Person B 
a lax or accepting bias.  
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Person A tends to  have a somewhat narrow scope or strict bias, while Person B shows a very 
broad scope or loose bias, saying “True” not only to the correct items but indeed to many 
items (including false or wrong items). This shows us that these two people were applying 
very different filters or scopes to the information: Person A was using a very narrow scope, 
being cautious in accepting something as true, while Person B was being much less cautious, 
using a much more lax scope to consider the information.  
Implications for training. Both approaches can have their pitfalls: too narrow or strict a 
scope means you can reject information that is useful and true, while too lax a scope can 
mean you are using wrong or useless information. As noted above, scope or bias can also 
shift when there is a sudden increase in the uncertainty of a situation, usually becoming more 
strict or narrow. For example, a sudden increase in risk level in fireground situations could 
mean that Person B above may become much stricter in their scoping, narrowing in on the 
correct items only. But it may also mean that the bias of Person A could become stricter too- 
with a very narrow scope that misses or overlooks correct information. There may no simple 
answer about the best level of bias to use. It depends on the demands of the situation to a 
large extent. However it seems that it would be beneficial to have some means to self-check 
on personal level of bias or scoping at key points in decision-making and the current project 
is embarking on further studies to that end. 
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